INTRODUCTION
Blackmail commentary continues to proliferate. One purpose of this paper is to show what we agree on. Its primary tool will be to define what I call the "central case" of blackmail literature, and to supply the connecting links that will allow us to see how various normative theories converge in condemning central case blackmail. Admittedly, the law criminalizes more than my central case. But once we recognize that the central case is neither puzzling nor paradoxical, it may be easier to handle the border cases that arise.
The Article first demonstrates why criminalizing blackmail involves neither a paradox nor a contradiction, notwithstanding the fact that blackmail law prohibits offers to sell discreditable information that the law would permit the seller to disclose without penalty. 1 The Article then sets out the central case of blackmail, 2 the standard economic argument for its criminalization, 3 and the nonstandard uncertainties that wealth effects produce in this area. 4 The Article then turns to its primary topic: presenting a deontologic moral justification for criminalizing blackmail. 5 The nonconsequentialist moral view best captures, I believe, the primary reasons why courts and legislatures have in fact made blackmail unlawful. I argue that most of the supposed ambiguities surrounding the deontologic case are red herrings obscuring the simple nature of the wrong committed by the blackmailer. 6 I also defend this argument against challenges such as the libertarian view that blackmail is indistinguishable from an ordinary commercial transaction. 7 The final sections of the Article return to discussing blackmail law from a consequentialist perspective, but with a twist: I present consequentialist arguments for criminalizing blackmail based upon the impact that noneconomic motives can have on the outcomes of blackmail attempts, and the impact that law can have upon these noneconomic motives. 8 I suggest in conclusion that truth cannot be found in either the economic ( consequentialist) or deontologic (nonconsequentialist) approaches standing alone, but that some union of the two is necessary for satisfactory resolutions of complex cases.
9

I. THE NONEXISTENT PARADOX
At the core of blackmail law supposedly lies the following paradox: Everyone has the right to seek money if he so chooses, and a possessor of information is ordinarily at liberty to disclose the information or keep it secret as he chooses, "but if I combine these rights it is blackmail. "
10 That is, it is criminal for the possessor of information to demand money in exchange for not doing something-disclosing information-that it is lawful for him to do or not do.II Though this may be a surprising conjunction, it is, strictly speaking, no paradox. A paradox is "[a] statement whose truth leads to a contradiction and the truth of whose denial leads to a contradiction. " 12 Suppose a judge stated that "blackmail is unlawful, and 'where a person has the right to do a certain act ... he has the right to threaten to do that act' 13 unless paid." This statement
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TRUTH AND CONSEQUENCES 1743 contains a contradiction, 14 which completes half of the conditions for a paradox. To constitute a paradox, however, the statement must also yield a contradiction if assumed to be false. The judge's statement will be false if any of its components 15 are false. But if the second portion of the judge's statement is false, it leads to no contradiction: If people do not invariably have a right to threaten to do or not do the things they are at liberty to do or not do, then blackmail's illegality is perfectly consistent with the larger pattern.
Hence the statement does not produce a paradox. More important than the logical point is the fact that the second portion of the judge's statement is false. Even if one temporarily puts aside the complication of the blackmailer's monetary demand, people do not invariably have a right to threaten to do or not to do the things they are at liberty to do or not to do. 16 Perhaps the mistaken opposite impression 17 arises out of a belief that the liberty to do 18 an act is inevitably greater than (and includes within itself) the liberty of threatening to do an act. But the right to do a greater thing does not always include the right to do the lesser; that is one of the lessons taught by the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. 19 14 Ifwe assume that the judge's statement is true, then it must be true both that blackmail is illegal and that what a person is legally allowed to do, that person is also allowed to threaten to do unless paid. But if the second part of this statement were true, then blackmail would be legal, which contradicts the first part of the statement. 15 The statement can be read as having three components: (1) blackmail is unlawful; (2) persons lawfully can threaten to do or not do anything they lawfully may do or not do; and (3) the lawfulness of the threat does not alter if coupled with a demand for payment. 16 See George P. Fletcher, Blackmail: The Paradigmatic Crime, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1617 REV. , 1618 REV. -19 (1993 (making this point and providing examples of illegal threats of independently legal activity). I do not mean to say that the illegality of the threatened action in a given case is irrelevant; in some circumstances, it may be a crucial factor. My point is merely that the illegality of a threatened act is not always a necessary condition for the illegality of a threat. CJ. F.M. Kamm, Non-consequentiali.sm 354, 370.71 (1992) (stating that factors that make moral differences only some of the time can nevertheless suffice to support a moral distinction). 17 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 13, at 561 ("The general proposition that a party may threaten that which he may do makes blackmail an anomalous exception to the general pattern of both criminal and civil responsibility."). 18 In usages such as this, "doing" should be read as "doing or not doing"; to repeat the language each time would be cumbersome. 19 The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that even though the government may withhold a benefit entirely, it can nevertheless be prohibited from offering the benefit on the condition that the recipient forgo a constitutional right. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415 REV. , 1415 In addition, threatening cannot be "included" in doing because threatening possesses elements that doing does not. Most notably, threatening to disclose induces action in a way that disclosure does not, 20 so that doing and threatening can have quite different effects. This occurs in part because the two acts affect different parties: any threat the blackmailer makes will be directed to the person with the embarrassing secret, but any disclosure will be to third parties. In Ho hf eldian terms, a privilege 21 to do would be distinct from a privilege to threaten since each regulates different relations between different people.
Further, the blackmailer does more than merely threaten: He threatens to disclose unless money is paid. 22 Regardless of whether we have liberty to threaten, the law often forbids us to commodify our liberties by selling them. Our liberties to make sexual use of our bodies cannot be bartered for cash in most states; our right to vote can neither be transferred gratuitously nor sold. The growing literature on inalienability 23 makes clear that doing and selling are quite different issues.
None of this should be surprising. In fact, much of the blackmail commentary can be organized around these simple points concerning the differences between doing and threatening. The Lindgren thesis, for example, is that blackmail is wrongful because the victim and blackmailer are playing with "someone else's ...
chips. "
24 This utilizes the point that doing and threatening affect {1989). The doctrine thus rejects "the view that the greater power to deny a benefit includes the lesser power to impose a condition on its receipt." Id. 2° For the distinction between assertions of fact on the one hand, and, on the other, "situation-altering" utterances and "action-inducing" utterances, see Kent Greenawalt, Criminal Coercion and Freedom of Speech, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1081 , 1091 . 21 For Hohfeld, a "privilege" is a liberty from governmental interference. See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE LJ. 16, 30-36 {1913) . 22 A demand for money is only the paradigmatic case. The proscription against blackmail may also include prohibition of nonmonetary demands {such as for sexual compliance), which usually, but not inevitably, implicate additional concerns of commodification. 25 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 {1972); MargaretJ. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 {1987); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931 {1985). 24 Lindgren, supra note 10, at 702. The notion is that the information subjected to bargaining may properly belong, at least in part, to third parties. For example, if an unfaithful husband pays hush money to conceal his infidelity, the blackmailer is receiving compensation while the affected wife receives neither information nor
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TRUTH AND CONSEQUENCES 1745 different parties. The economic "waste" thesis, associated with Daly and Giertz, 25 Coase, 26 Ginsburg and Shechtman, 27 and Epstein, 28 argues that allowing blackmail threats will result in the expenditure of resources in allocatively-fruitless bargaining29 and in "digging up dirt ... and then reburying it. " 30 This explanation incorporates the point that the dynamic effects of doing and threatening can be quite different. The arguments of those who draw upon the Bloustein thesis, that privacy should not be commodified against the will of the primary party, 31 correspond with the point that law often makes liberties inalienable.
32
With each explanation comes another refutation of the notion that criminalizing blackmail is contradictory. At this point, perhaps only a subset of libertarians believe that blackmail law conflicts with other proper patterns of the law. 33 Yet criminalizing blackmail still raises a number of questions. In the hope of both simplifying and advancing the blackmail debate, 1849, 1865 (1993) (arguing that blackmail results in "an industry the output of which is nil, although resources are consumed in its operation").
28 See Epstein, supra note 13, at 561-65 (arguing that legalizing blackmail will lead to the creation of industries which produce nothing of value).
29 See Daly & Giertz, supra note 25, at 1000 ("With any positive level of bargaining costs, extortion will clearly lead to a reduction of social welfare since scarce resources are utilized in the process of negotiation while failing to improve the allocation of resources."). REV. 197, 205 (1965) (stating that "[t] he criminality of blackmail represents a social judgment that one may not manipulate as an income-producing asset knowledge about another person's past").
llll See infra part IV.E (discussing the libertarian view). This central case appears in various guises. It describes, for example, Robert Nozick's paradigm of "unproductive exchange." 37 Nozick argues that an unproductive exchange has these characteristics: (1) the purchaser would be better off if the seller had nothing at all to do with her, (2) if the exchange were impossible, "one of the parties to the potential exchange would be no worse off" than if the exchange were possible, 38 and (3) that party does not deserve to have the other party harm her. 39 Clearly the victim of my central case meets all of these criteria: she would be better off if the seller of silence were out of her life, and if the money-forsilence exchange were impossible she would be no worse off because the blackmailer would then not have bothered either to acquire the information or to make a threat of disclosure. 40 (In fact, the victim would be better off if exchanges of money for 54 Whether or not the blackmail act should be criminalized is a separate inquiry. See infra part V. 35 Types of extortion other than blackmail involve leverage other than the threat to reveal information.
36 My definition of central case blackmail does not include cases where the blackmail is motivated by a desire to reform the behavior of the threatened party.
37 ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 84-86 (1974) . 38 Id. at 85. For a discussion of the importance of this second condition, see infra note 140. 39 This third characteristic is implied rather than directly stated. See NOZICK, supra note 37, at 84 (distinguishing the case where "I deserved to be harmed by you") (emphasis omitted). 40 Jeffrie Murphy essentially utilizes Nozick's theory in defending the criminalization of such a case. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Blackmail: A Preliminary Inquiry, 63 THE MONIST 156, 163-66 (1980) .
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TRUTH AND CONSEQUENCES 1747 silence were impossible.) As for the third condition, there is nothing in the description of central case blackmail that suggests the victim has done something to the blackmailer that would give the blackmailer basis for a corrective justice claim against her; 41 in central case blackmail the threatener knows of a victim's discreditable act not because the threatener was himself harmed by it, but rather because he sought out the information for purposes of financial leverage. So all of Nozick's three conditions are met. Kent Greenawalt's definition of "manipulative threat" also captures the central case: manipulative threats are "threats of action when the actor would not suggest or engage in the action were it not for the threat itself and its linkage to a demand. " 42 In such instances, "the possibility of [disclosure] has come into existence only as a part of a plan to induce" the victim to act as the blackmailer desires.
48
The central case also plays a central role in the economic analyses. The entrepreneurs of Richard Epstein's "Blackmail, Inc." are by definition persons who go into the information business precisely to obtain material to use as leverage; 44 they have no independent interest in disclosure aside from maintaining the credibility of their threats. Instead they intend to bind themselves, via contract with the victim, into not using the very resources they have expended money to locate. Similarly, Coase 45 and Ginsburg 41 Although Nozick addresses the issue only obliquely, principles of corrective justice suggest that the issue is whether the victim deserves to be harmed in this particular way by this particular person, not whether the victim might deserve to be harmed in some way by someone. See Ernest Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 407, 428-38, 444-50 (1987) and Shechtman 46 worry about people expending resources in gathering information they have no intention of ever using except as a lever with which to extract an unproductive transfer payment. Daly and Giertz mal~e a related point from a similar paradigmatic case: "The victim of extortion is forced to compensate the perpetrator to refrain from doing something which does not directly benefit anyone and would not be undertaken save for its bribe generating potential. " 47 The reasons why the economists view such a central case as wasteful are fairly obvious, and are briefly spelled out in the next section.
Ill. A CONSEQUENTIALIST PERSPECTIVE
A. The Economic Argument: Allocative and Nonallocative Effects
The common law does not ordinarily allow persons to bring suit for recompense when they take actions that avert harm to others. Among other things, such suits would be difficult to implement,
48
would involve high administrative costs, and could, because of problems such as valuation, impose net harms on the supposed recipients of the harm-reducing activity. 49 Ordinarily, however, persons are permitted to bargain over the potentially harmful acts they are free to perform, 50 and by contract 46 See Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra note 27, at 1859. 47 Daly & Giertz, supra note 44, at 736; see also Daly & Giertz, supra note 25 (by implication).
48 Consider, for example, the difficult question of how to determine the amount of monetary recovery a harm-avoider should receive. If the court were to use as a measure the amount of damage the claimant refrained from inflicting, it would not only introduce intractable evidentiary problems (how badly would the claimant have acted?), but could also encourage potential claimants to create a record of prior bad acts, to provide themselves with a plausible baseline for seeking reward. In addition, there are probably intractable problems of coordination in choosing the proper persons to encourage or reward; in some situations virtually the entire public is capable of claiming that they have refrained from inflicting harm. For an exploration of these and other implementation problems, see Wendy J. Gordon, Of Hanns and Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 449, 455-56 (1992) ; see also Donald Wittman, Liability for Hann or Restitution for Benefit1, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 57, 62-64 (1984) (illustrating the difficulty of calculating money owed when one has a "situation of no damage" but rather the avoidance of harm 51 and if the central case assumption holds that disclosure has no independent value to the seller/ blackmailer, the purchaser will probably purchase silence if blackmail is legal.
52 Admittedly, strategic behavior might sometimes interfere with the parties' attainment of this mutually beneficial result. 53 But as a general matter, allowing central case forbearance. He can choose, however, to negotiate over the fence's height, and demand consideration from his neighbor in exchange for keeping the fence low. As to those acts which the potential seller is not legally free to perform, the other party ordinarily can bring suit to restrain or obtain compensation for them. Of course, some willingness to pay for harm-avoidance may remain (due to the inadequacies of prospective legal restraint and after-the-fact compensation), but it is usually unlawful for a potential harm-causer to demand payment in exchange for refraining from unlawful acts.
51 See Daly & Giertz, supra note 25, at 998 & fig.I (schedule DD) (graphing the correlation between victim payments and the blackmailer's ability to injure). Daly and Giertz recognize that the real motivations may be more complex. See id. at 998 n.2 (recognizing the possibility that the victim could suffer a greater loss than "the resources he gives up to the extortionist"). 52 See id. at 9Q8 (explaining the likelihood of "successful negotiations"). By contrast, if blackmail is not legal, the victim has leverage with which to refuse purchase. See infra part V.A.1. 55 For example, the blackmailer may overestimate the price the victim would be willing to pay and "dig in" at an unrealistic demand level. If this happens, the blackmail in a world of positive transaction costs would waste resources in bargaining or investigation without any allocative payoff. 54 
B. The Irrelevance of Lawful or Beneficial Nature of the Threatened Action
The initial "paradox" involved the fact that the blackmailer threatened to do an act that was itself lawful and, by implication, beneficial. 55 The foregoing discussion should make clear that the beneficial or harmful nature of the action threatened is irrelevant to the core economic argument against central case blackmail. In central.case blackmail, the threatened action has no independent positive value for either party.
56
What motivates the bargain exchange of money for silence will not occur, notwithstanding the fact that the blackmailer could have benefitted from selling his silence at a far lower figure. 54 See Coase, supra note 26, at 671 (same); Daly & Giertz, supra note 25, at 1000 (stating that extortion consumes resources through costs of negotiation with no accompanying improvement in resource allocation, resulting in a net decrease in social welfare); Daly & Giertz, supra note 44, at 736 (same); Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra note 27, at 1863-64 (same).
Lindgren has characterized this argument as resting on the comparative magnitude of the transaction costs involved in a standard transaction as compared to a blackmail transaction. See Lindgren, supra note 10, at 695-97 (comparing transactions costs in "blackmail bargaining" and "legitimate bargaining"). He therefore argues that the argument cannot be advanced without empirical proof of how great the transaction costs in each type of interaction might be. See id. But comparison among absolute levels of transaction costs seems besides the point, at least as to central case blackmail occurring between economically motivated actors. In such a nonallocative transaction, any transaction cost is too much. When the time comes to integrate the ideal central case into a more realistic picture of costs and benefits, then Lindgren's point becomes more relevant.
For some of the noneconomic distinctions between standard and blackmail transactions, see infra part IV.E. 55 Note that the discussion here addresses the beneficial nature of the threatened action and does not separately consider its lawfulness. That is because I am assuming that in assessing the "blackmail paradox," the lawfulness of disclosure would have meaning for the economist merely as an indirect indicator that disclosure yielded more benefits than costs.
The analysis would be more complex if we were to take into account the possibility that any criminalization of a threat to do a lawful act would itself have negative consequences. For example, such criminalization may cause confusion or erode respect for the law. I give no attention to these possibilities since I think that criminalizing central case blackmail has no such consequences, largely because the person on the street perceives blackmail to be a wrong; therefore, criminalization of the activity evokes no sense of inconsistency. See Epstein, supra note 13, at 553 (referring to the "popular sentiment" for criminalizing blackmail).
56 The blackmailer may have some interest in disclosure in order to make the instead is that the action will have a negative value to the person threatened which is greater than the null or negative 57 value it has for the threatener. 58 In such a context, it is in no one's interest for the threat of disclosure to be carried out, and therefore, if the parties are economically motivated, 59 making the threat will not direct resources toward carrying out the threatened act. The fact that the action will not take place renders unnecessary any assessment of the costs or benefits of the threatened act.
C. Caveat: Dynamic Economic Effects of Legalizing Central Case Blackmail
The above argument suggested that because central case blackmailers will be paid to refrain from disclosure, their threats will not result in an ultimate change in the allocation of the contested information. Real-world effects will necessarily be more complex. For example, legalization could increase not only instances of central case blackmail, but also the number of cases where blackmailers have affirmative and independent motives to disclose. 61 threat offurther disclosure credible, but disclosure has leverage value to him only by virtue of the possibility of his contracting with the victim. See, e.g., Daly &: Giertz, supra note 25, at 998 (including the "externality generating party" who receives no direct benefits as one of the explicit features of their model}. This leverage value is thus not an independent positive value to the single-instance, central-case blackmailer. 57 Carrying out the threat may be costly to the extortioner, in which case the threatened action is a net negative to both the victim and the blackmailer. See Daly &: Giertz, supra note 25, at 998 &: fig. 1 (depicting marginal benefits and damages). 58 Strictly speaking, a blackmail bargain could occur even if disclosure were more costly to the blackmailer than to the victim, so long as the blackmailer could conceal this fact and "bluff' the other into paying for silence.
59 By "economically motivated" I mean to indicate that the amount of money the victim would be willing to pay is solely a function of the injury to her reputation the blackmailer is in a position to inflict, and that the blackmailer's sole motives are minimizing his costs (of research and the like) and maximizing the payoff he receives from the victim. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
If the parties are not economically motivated in this sense, then the analysis is more complex. Such a situation could occur if "honor" has an economic dimension that could dictate whether the victim rejects the blackmail deal. The standard economic case on the "waste" of blackmail depends on the assumption that the parties' demand structures will usually lead to a deal where silence is purchased.
60 For example, the model of the Daly and Giertz paper was originally intended to address extortion by threat of violence. See Daly&: Giertz, supra note 25, at 998 (discussing extortion). Though violence is action which is unlawful and whose consequences are negative, the Daly and Giertz model equally well describes the supply and demand structure of central case blackmail. See Daly&: Giertz, supra note 44, at 736 n.2 ("It should be noted that the key feature of extortion is the use of a threat to elicit a payment, not whether the threatened action is legal or illegal."). 61 Ifblackmail were legalized, persons or corporations might develop a systematic When disclosure has an independent positive value to blackmailers, 62 disclosure in a particular case might be worth more to the blackmail entrepreneur than silence is worth to the victim. If so, blackmail efforts may be unsuccessful, and disclosure (reallocation of the information) might result. Such disclosure might sometimes be more socially valuable than silence would have been. For another example, Professor William Landes and Judge Richard Posner have suggested that successful blackmail may have a positive long-term allocative effect on resources other than information, in that fear of having to make blackmail payments may induce potential nonconformists to conform their behavior to majority standards. 63 This observation applies even to central case blackmail.
Of course, the fact that blackmail may result in some deterrence or disclosure is not fatal to the consequentialist case for its criminalization. Persons will engage in blackmail only if they expect the activity will yield a payoff in purchased silence-and all silenceyielding (nonallocative) transactions will impose transaction costs that could well outweigh any beneficial disclosure resulting from blackmail attempts that misfire. Further, the possible allocative effect resulting from occasional disclosure or deterrence is not guaranteed to be beneficial. Disclosure may have a social value that is positive (for example, disclosing to the electorate that a mayor has embezzled funds) or negative (for example, making public a secret practice of blackmail, and they might need to establish a reputation for carrying out their threats. See Epstein, supra note 13, at 562 (predicting "an open and public market for a new set of social institution to exploit the gains" if blackmail were legalized).
62 When this happens, such blackmail is definitionally outside the "central case." Unlike the "central case" blackmailer, the company seeking to convince the public of its power and ruthlessness has a reason to gather and disclose information that is independent from the threat to the individual subject of the information. See Coase, supra note 26, at 675. This does not mean one can exclude the credibility motive from discussion, however, since the two kinds ofblackmail are likely to arise together.
From a deontological perspective, this kind of blackmail would be treated the same as central case blackmail. In central case blackmail, the threatener intends to injure the person who does not want the information disclosed. In credibilitymotivated disclosure, this person is an object of the blackmailer's harm, but so are third parties (prospective victims) whom the blackmailer intends to harm. Since the credibility-seeking blackmailer is disclosing only as a tool to aid him in unjustifiably hurting others, the deontologic argument against him remains strong. See infra part IV.
68 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 42-43 (1975) . For background, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 231-58, 268-86 (1981). of no public import that causes deep distress in the family concerned, such as the fact that when the mayor was a child he was sexually abused by a relative). It is similarly possible that blackmailinduced conformity might involve a net cost to society. 64 Also, Landes and Posner suggest that efficiency considerations of governmental versus private law enforcement may justify criminalization regardless of the extent to which blackmail could deter inefficient acts. 65 The waste inherent in central case blackmail should lie at the core of the economic analysis. Nevertheless, when an economic assessment of criminalization needs to be made, instances of central case blackmail should not be viewed in isolation, both because other kinds of blackmail will arise that may be difficult to distinguish from it, and because the dynamic effects of successful central case 64 I suspect that institutions such as Blackmail, Inc. would primarily discourage harmless behavior that happens to be nonconforming (for example, same-gender sexual relations). Our society already makes harmless and nonconforming behavior too expensive. If so, legalization would then have negative long·term allocative effects, along with the previously discussed waste of transactional and investigative resources.
One might argue that this is a contestable value judgment, and that as an economic matter such costs are appropriately imposed on the nonconforming activity. For example, if the public disapproves of an act, it might be argued that the "disutility" caused the public by their knowledge of the act's occurrence should be imposed upon the actors as a sort of strict liability, much as the injuries that hazardous activities cause are imposed on the activities as a "cost of doing business." There are however several problems with such an argument.
First, determining "what is a cost of what" is not a simple factual judgment. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 133, 133-73 (1970) . The cost to the public of knowing that persons are engaging in a disapproved activity is produced by a combination of the public's taste and the persons' behavior. It may be more appropriate to let the public bear the "cost" of its taste than to impose it on the persons whose behavior, when combined with the public taste, causes the offense. An economist would probably ask, "who is the cheapest cost avoider." See id at 135. Since tastes about others' sexual behavior or orientation are easier to change than one's own behavior or orientation, I suspect the public is a cheaper cost avoider in this case. My rebuttal here is, of course, a twopenny version of a now-standard utilitarian defense of sheltering consensual adult sexual relations from legal regulation. See JOHNS. MILL, ON LIBER'IY 91-103 (Currin V. Shields ed., 1956).
Second, so long as the harmless behavior is not disclosed (and in central case blackmail it would indeed remain secret), there are few if any costs to the public. Reducing or increasing the number of potentially offensive acts would not affect the costs to a public unaware of them.
blackmail may result in changing the behavior of persons who might fear blackmail in the future.
D. Imperfect Knowledge
Given the above complications, it might be argued that allowing blackmail data to be bought and sold is the best way to finesse the economic unknowns. After all, markets supposedly incorporate the decentralized knowledge of many parties to direct resources to their highest valued uses, even when those uses may be unknown to central decisionmakers. 66 The Coase theorem teaches that in a properly functioning market, absent transaction costs, people will trade a resource until it reaches its highest valued use regardless of where the government initially assigns its ownership. 67 If transaction costs are reasonably low and if the theorem holds, it might be argued that allowing blackmail transactions will simultaneously tell us whether disclosure or silence is optimal and move us to the optimal result.
However, in blackmail the transaction costs can be so high as to preclude all the affected parties from making their preferences known through the market, thus preventing transactions from reliably directing resources to their highest valued uses. For example, there may be a multitude of voters who would be willing to pay something to learn that their mayor has embezzled public funds. Yet a person who has this information cannot practicably contact this mass of possible buyers; even if he could, freerider strategic behavior could well fores tall agreement, 68 particularly when coupled with the well-recognized difficulties that accompany any attempt to sell a secret to people ignorant of its content. REV. 783, 783 (1990) .
68 Such problems might be avoided if there were a journalistic market that paid for "tips" an amount equivalent to what the citizens would pay in a competitive market.
69 See Gordon, supra note 48, at 475-77 (examining the difficulties that would beset the seller of an intellectual product if he had no rights to prevent copying).
1993]
TRUTH AND CONSEQUENCES 1755 benefits that could flow from disclosure are likely to be kept external to the blackmailer's decision. If so, the outcome of dealings among blackmailer, victim, and other possible buyers will prove unreliable as a guide to societal economic welfare. Even if the transaction cost and strategic behavior problems could be overcome, blackmail raises an additional problem for application of the Coase theorem. For certain fundamental resources, the location of the highest valued use can vary with the law's assignment of initial entitlements. These are the resources whose possession can affect our ability to enjoy all other goods. Plausible examples include life, sight, and one's standing in a community of peers. The fact that the valuation of these resources can depend on the law is a result of the "wealth effect" that ownership has on one's ability to express one's preferences in the market.
70
Ronald Coase himself realized that changes in the allocation of rights concerning fundamental resources (such as the abolition of slaveowners' rights over other human beings) could affect the final allocation of goods even in a world without transaction costs. 71 Herbert Hovenkamp goes so far as to argue that the absence of wealth effects is one of the premises of the Coase theorem.
72 Reputation may well be one of those fundamental resources with strong wealth effects.
The wealth effect phenomenon does not afflict central case blackmail because, regardless of initial allocations, both parties pref er nondisclosure and will negotiate to achieve it. 78 However, 70 See infra note 84 (discussing the phenomenon of"wealth" or "income" effects 157, 173-74 (1988) (commenting, however , that wealth effects "will normally be so insignificant that they can safely be neglected").
72 See Hovenkamp, supra note 67, at 787. Hovenkamp also notes, however, that the Coase theorem can be interpreted as having two parts: an "efficiency thesis" which says that resources will end up in their highest valued uses regardless of how legal rights are allocated, and an "invariance thesis" which says that resources will also end up in the same uses regardless of how legal rights are allocated. See id. at 785. Wealth effects are technically relevant only to the invariance thesis. As for the first thesis, actors in a world without transaction costs will still reach efficient results even if strong wealth effects exist. although what constitutes efficient resource use may well be different when the allocation of legal rights shifts.
7 s Regardless of who starts out with rights over the information, in central case blackmail silence will be the end result of the transaction (that is, silence will be the highest valued use of the information as between blackmailer and victim) because the value of disclosure is not positive for either party. See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
in the more analytically troubling cases where disclosure has some independent positive value to the blackmailer, the wealth effect makes the market an unreliable indicator of the location of the information's highest valued use. 74 In fact, for those fundamental resources which implicate strong wealth effects, one cannot speak of the highest valued use except in the context of a particular allocative starting point.
75
To illustrate how the highest valued use may vary with the allocation of legal rights, assume for example that a right of privacy shields a celebrity's disastrous secret7 6 so that the celebrity has a kind of ownership in the information. If a neighbor learns the secret and wishes to make it into a docudrama to sell to the networks, and if she needs the celebrity's permission to do so, then the celebrity may be unwilling to give permission no matter how much money the neighbor offers. If so, the highest valued use of the information seems to be silence.
However, if we assume instead that the celebrity does not own the information-if, for example, the jurisdiction's right to privacy does not protect secrets of this type or does not extend to docudramas 77 -the neighbor who learned the secret no longer needs to ask Where the highest valued use is known, usual economic wisdom suggests the resource should be initially assigned to that use. Blackmail law produces an analogous result: though it does not assign the victim a right to silence (for when parties other than the blackmailer are concerned, disclosure might be the highervalued use), it instead prohibits the central case blackmailer from selling the victim her liberty of disclosure. As between those two parties, the transaction is not allocatively effective, since the central case blackmailer will always sell and silence will always result. 74 Assume that the value of disclosure is positive for the blackmailer (e.g., she has markets for the information in addition to the victim). If she has both the liberty to disclose and a power to sell that liberty to anyone she wants, she will have a minimum price beneath which she will not sell-and the person who is the subject of the information may not have enough money or borrowing power to meet that price. Such noncentral types of blackmail are thus potentially afflicted with strong wealth effects. These blackmail cases are more difficult to evaluate from an economic persfective, for these instances may produce disclosures that benefit third parties. 7 To decide what is the best use for such resources, it is necessary to utilize a criterion (perhaps "utility") other than the usual economic criterion of "value" measured by willingness to pay. 76 Wealth effects strong enough to cause variation in highest valued use will occur primarily with negative reputational information. Neutral or positive reputational information is likely to have a constant highest valued use regardless of initial allocation, except where the party concerned has a particularly strong desire for privacy. 77 The docudrama issue remains unresolved within right of publicity doctrine. Such a suit was reportedly brought by Elizabeth Taylor. See Tamar Levin, Whose Life permission. Instead, she may give the celebrity a choice between disclosure or paying the equivalent of what a network would pay for the story. Against this legal background, the celebrity is limited in his ability to protect his reputation by the amount of money he possesses or can borrow. If the celebrity does not have enough money to outbid the network, then the highest valued use of the information would now· seem to be publication, even if all that has changed is the initial assignment of rights.
As I have argued elsewhere, an economist should not give the market her usual deference in situations where the allocative outcome of bargaining will depend on the initial assignment of ownership rights. 78 Of course, this argument suggests only that we should not rely on the market to inform us what the best use is for some kinds of resources; the argument does not itself tell us anything about what the best use should be. Outside the instance of central case blackmail, economists might well debate to whom the relevant rights should be assigned. 79 Nevertheless, to the extent that the market is unable to make determinate choices regarding the highest valued use of resources such as one's good reputation, we know that outlawing blackmail deprives us of relatively little in the way of meaningful information. The only determinate answer likely to be provided by the market is with respect to central case blackmail: whatever the initial allocation, the parties will likely opt for silence. As to that case, then, the market analysis provides useful economic information, and that information supports criminalization. 79 For example, as between the news media and someone seeking to use his right of publicity or his copyright as an instrument of private censorship, it may be best to place the entitlement in the media. See id.
IV. A NONCONSEQUENTIALIST MORAL VIEW
A. Background I suspect that policymakers prohibit blackmail less because of economic waste or inefficiency than because they perceive the act of blackmail to be wrong in itself. Yet the nonconsequential case for blackmail's wrongfulness has not yet been clearly stated. In one of the first and most interesting articles on modern blackmail theory, Jeffrie Murphy suggested that the deontological case against blackmail might have intractable difficulties. 80 Even Robert Nozick, usually thought of as a deontologic theorist, has grounded his blackmail argument on the idea of "unproductive exchanges, " 81 a rationale that sounds in consequentialism and whose deontological rationale is opaque. A number of commentators have asked why it is wrong for an exchange to be "unproductive" in Nozick's sense, 82 and the literature has provided no apparent answer. 83 Yet to me the deontologic case against blackmail seems clear. One person deliberately seeks to harm another to serve her own ends-to exact money or other advantage-and does so in a context where she has no conceivable justification for her act. Admittedly, the sum that the victim pays a blackmailer lacks economic significance because it is a "mere" transfer payment that has virtually no systematic allocative effect, 84 but from a deontologic perspective 80 See Murphy, supra note 40, at 162-63. 81 See NOZICK, supra note 37, at 84-86. 82 See Murphy, supra note 40, at 158 ("It is not obvious on its face ••• that unproductive economic exchanges are immoral. Nozick gives no such argument and I am skeptical that one can be given."); cf. Lindgren, supra note 10, at 700 ("If blackmail is an unproductive exchange, it is certainly not unproductive in the sense Nozick intends.").
ss Standing alone, Nozick's paradigm of"unproductive exchange" is an insufficient explanation of blackmail's wrongfulness. But when it is subjected to a few alterations, the "unproductive exchange" paradigm can provide a definition of"harm" useful for the blackmail context. See infra part IV.E.2. The notion of "harm," in turn, constitutes an essential link in this Article's argument that blackmail is wrongful because it constitutes an intentional unjustified harm to a justified holding. 
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the transfer payment provides the key to the whole analysis. The nature of the weapon the blackmailer uses to obtain her paymentthat her threat of disclosure is a threat to do something lawfultends to obscure this from view. But the fact that the threat relates to the disclosure of information is no more than a red herring. 85 The blackmailer is concerned with the nature of the threat she employs only in the instrumental way that a butcher is concerned with what knife to use. 86 To demonstrate the irrelevance of the threatened act from a nonconsequentialist perspective of blackmail, I will employ the "doctrine of double effect." 87 Once the nature of the blackmailer's act is stripped clear with the analogical aid of that doctrine, blackmail can be seen simply as an unjustified intentional infliction of harm on another to benefit one's self.
B. Means and Ends
Economics, act-utilitarianism, and other forms of consequentialist normative inquiry take an "impartial" or objective view of reality. Their norms are agent-neutral; the only question in such systems is what outcomes should obtain. 88 By contrast, there are dutyoriented or "deontological" perspectives that ask how outcomes are arrived at. The deontological perspective is sometimes said to be The money paid by the blackmail victim is likely to have significant allocative "income effects" if, for example, the amount happens to constitute a very high percentage of the assets or the income stream of one of the parties. However, if the blackmail payment is not very large, its transfer will probably have no significant allocative results; if so, from an economic perspective, it would not matter who owns the money.
Even if the size of the payment is great enough to cause income effects, it will be difficult to analyze the allocative effects in any systematic way. (Would the victims of successful blackmail switch from Cadillacs to Tercels while successful blackmailers switched from Escorts to BMWs?) Even if such income effects exist, therefore, they would be hard to predict and thus not useful for an economic analysis of blackmail. 85 Manipulative threats may not even be communications. Greenawalt has argued that such a threat is a type of action, and possesses a "situation-altering character [that] takes it outside the scope of expression," at least for some purposes. Greenawalt, supra note 20, at 1099.
86 The violent and unlawful nature of a threatened act may make the extortionist's moral wrong more serious ("I will break your legs" as compared with "I will disclose your secret"), but a threat may constitute a moral wrong even if the threatened act is neither wrongful nor unlawful. 87 See infra text accompanying notes 105-06. 88 My discussion comparing objective and subjective perspectives on morality is much indebted to THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 165-88 (1986) . the perspective of the agent by whose acts the outcomes are achieved; 89 it is in that way subjective. To the actor, it matters not only that the ultimate outcome of an act may be good, but also whether she will in the process have to do an act that is wrong 90 - and wrongness is not determined solely by reference to ultimate outcomes. Rather, the core of the dominant deontologic view holds that it is wrong to treat another as a means rather than as an end in himself, "to treat someone as if he existed for purposes he does not share." 91 To transfer unjustifiably another's benefit to one's self is particularly wrongful, for it denies the fundamental equality of persons so to prefer one's self over another. But under the strict deontologic view, it is also wrongful to use another person to achieve a beneficial outcome for many. This principle almost certainly has some popular recognition; most of us would hesitate to do significant injury to an innocent even if the result were to give succor to an entire city. 92 The duty not to harm the innocent is considered a binding side-constraint on an agent's pursuit of good outcomes.
93
89 Although some commentators consider rule utilitarianism a form of deontology, see, e.g., Robert G. Olson, Deontological Ethics, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSO-PHY, supra note 12, at 343, the discussion here assumes a Kant-oriented deontological approach. Note also that the deontological perspective is only one of several types of ai!f,ent-relativity. See NAGEL, supra note 88, at 165-67.
Nagel Tell me yourself, I challenge you-answer. Imagine that you are creating a fabric of human destiny with the object of making men happy in the end, giving them peace and rest at last, but that it was essential and inevitable to torture to death only one tiny creature-that little child ••• and to found that edifice on its unavenged tears, would you consent to be the architect under those conditions? Tell me, and tell the truth. FYODOR DOSTOEVSKI, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV 226 (Constance Garnett trans., 1976) (1880).
Admittedly, there are many ways to argue that the perception that we are morally constrained in such cases is false consciousness. Cf. NAGEL, supra note 88, at 186-87 (discussing whether any pursuit of objective ethics depends on false consciousness).
93 See NOZICK, supra note 37, at 28-35.
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From a deontologic perspective, blackmail is a harm that impugns the worth of the targeted individual, 94 using his welfare as a mere tool for another's advancement. Thomas Nagel observes:
The deontological constraint ..• expresses the direct appeal to the point of view of the agent from the point of view of the person on whom he is acting. It operates through that relation. The victim feels outrage when he is deliberately harmed ... not simply because of the quantity of the harm but because of the assault on his value of having my actions guided by his evil. 95 Acts of unjustified intentional harm are thus the perversion of the personal. Blackmail is one such act, 96 and as such is for bidden by the central deontologic constraint.
C. Intent, Consequences, and the Doctrine of Double Effect
As mentioned, deontologic approaches usually stress the duties that exist independently of the consequences they cause. It is said, for example, that one person should never use another solely as a means, 97 which can be taken to imply that no unconsented harm should be done to another regardless of the good to be produced by the actor's overall goal. Some deontological philosophers, however, distinguish between direct and oblique intention, 98 between foreseen and intended effects, 99 or among effects that vary in their degree of "closeness" with the intended effect. 100 9.f CJ. Kamm Where a consequence is not directly intended, 1°1 the deontological constraints may apply with less force. The usefulness of the distinction can be illustrated by looking at the kind of puzzle that has long fascinated Guido Calabresi: Why is it that our society spends much more to save named individualsspending a fortune to rescue a child who has fallen down a nearlyinaccessible well, for example, or a bridge worker caught under a fallen girder-than we do on safety precautions that would avoid the same amount of harm (or even more) to unknown but statistically certain individuals?
102
The most obvious explanation of these phenomena is a deontological distinction between direct and indirect intention, between the certainty of a known event and the indefiniteness of the merely foreseeable: it is morally worse to turn one's back on a known person with real suffering than to ignore the odds that in a distant place an unknown person will die.
108
A key attraction of the deontologic perspective is its focus on the relation between the actor's intent and the personhood of the the doctrine of double effect). The various distinctions mentioned (foreseen/ intended, close/ not close, and direct/ oblique) are verbal attempts to capture similar concepts. 101 The philosophers are using "intent" as it appears in ordinary language, rather than as a torts lawyer would use the term. Under the Restatement (Second) ofTorts, an actor "intends" all those results which he knows his actions are nubstantially certain to bring about. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1964 )("The word 'intent' is used .•• to denote that the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it.") (emphasis added). For the philosophers, by contrast, mere knowledge that a bad result will follow does not suffice to constitute direct intention. 1987) . One explanation may be that jurors share a deontologic value system: the more explicit the decision a corporation makes to take an act that causes injury, the more that decision constitutes a directly intended harm.
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other. To let the child perish in the well is equivalent to telling a known person that she is worth less than the resources it would take to save her; to fail to put covers on all wells delivers no such message to any particular person. The former action is an affront to an individual in the way the latter is not. 104 We identify with the person who feels herself the victim of an intentional choice, even if the choice is an arguably good one (for instance, foregoing the rescue of one child in order to save the funds needed to avert peril to many more).
The rescue examples deal with aiding. Blackmail is a case of harming. The role of direct intent in assessing the deontological status of harmful acts is usefully addressed with the "doctrine of double effect."
Advocates of the doctrine of double effect (DDE) allow a departure from the strong constraints of deontologic theory. They argue that it can sometimes be morally permissible to do an act that has bad consequences if they are outweighed by the good, 105 so long as the harms are not directly intended. 106 To determine 104 Person-directed choices afford the choosers the ability to discriminate for or against individuals, while random effects provide no such opportunity. Perhaps part of the grievance involved in "direct" choices is that the known victim feels singled out in a way that the random victim may not.
This consideration impacts on both equality and utility. Allowing person-directed discrimination creates the possibility of unequal treatment; this possibility may in turn lead to anger and revolt among those subjected to discrimination as well as personal demoralization.
Kamm offers another possible explanation of why it might be particularly important not to cause direct intentional harm, noting that " [i] fwe are inviolable in a certain way, we are more important creatures than violable ones; such a higher status is itself a benefit to us." Kamm, supra note 16, at 386 (discussing the significance of inviolability).
105 Sometimes the doctrine's effect is stated in an all-or-nothing manner. I find Quinn's approach more persuasive:
The DDE .
•. discriminates against agency in which there is some kind of intending of an objectionable outcome as conducive to the agent's end, and it discriminates in favor of agency that involves only foreseeing, but not that kind of intending, of an objectionable outcome. That is, it favors and disfavors these forms of agency in allowing that, ceteris paribus [other things being equal], the pursuit of a great enough good might justify one but not the other.
Quinn, supra note 91, at 181.
106 Nagel gives the principle the following interpretation:
The principle [of double effect] says that to violate deontological constraints one must maltreat someone else intentionally. The maltreatment must be something that one does or chooses, either as an end or as a means, rather than something one's actions merely cause or fail to prevent but that one whether a harm is directly intended, DDE asks, "if the harm could somehow be averted, would the actor undertake the disputed action anyway?" "[A] man is said not strictly, or directly, to intend the foreseen consequences of his voluntary actions where these are neither the end at which he is aiming nor the means to this end."107 A standard hypothetical illustrating DDE compares strategic bombing (done to win the war by destroying munitions factories) with terror bombing (done to win the war by demoralizing the enemy). It is assumed that the war is a "just war," that both bomber pilots know how many civilians they will kill, and that both kinds of bombing will each kill exactly the same number of civilians.
The killing of civilians does not motivate the strategic bomber's action and so is not his direct intent; we know this because if the civilians were somehow protected from injury, he would have bombed anyway. Under DDE, therefore, the strategic bomber in a just war does not necessarily violate deontological constraints. By contrast, the terror bomber would not bomb if civilians were protected, for then he could not accomplish his goal of demoralizing the enemy. Killing civilians is thus part of his "direct" intent. Therefore, even in a just war, terror bombing would be forbidden under DDE.
Though the doctrine and its application have their difficulties, 108 DDE serves as a useful tool for our purposes. The doctrine suggests that when one's direct intent is to do good, harmful side-effects do not constitute absolute constraints against the action. Conversely, in what one might call the "doctrine of single effect" (DSE), when one's direct intent is to do harm, beneficial side-effects doesn't aim at. NAGEL it appears that no significance should be given to either the lawful nature of the threatened disclosure or the potentially beneficial sideeffects of blackmail. Were the disclosure unlawful or impossible but the victim still capable of being frightened into paying, the typical blackmailer would extract the money anyway. Similarly, were the supposed beneficial side-effects of blackmail somehow eliminated, that would make no difference to the blackmailer.
Under DSE, therefore, the blackmailer violates deontological constraints if he threatens disclosure in order to obtain money or other advantage because his intent is directed to the money, not to the disclosure or beneficial side-effects that might be produced. These latter factors are thus outside the intent of the blackmailer in the same way the killing of civilians is outside the intent of the strategic bomber: if blackmail's purported beneficial effects were eliminated or if civilians were protected, the actors would go forward. 109 If an actor's end does not violate the deontologic constraints, then under the doctrine of double effect the existence of bad side-effects does not necessarily bar his activity. This may help to distinguish blackmail from a boycott or an act of civil disobedience. In such cases it may be that the end is good, perhaps because the persons being pressured may be receiving their "just deserts." CJ. Fletcher, supra note 96, at 1635 (suggesting that it may be just to counteract the domination of one party by reducing him to the position of those he has dominated). If so, these activities may be distinguishable from blackmail because they may have a permissible or just end, while the blackmailer's end is to do an unjustified harm. But see Eric Mack, In Defense of Blackmail, 41 PHIL. STUD. 273. 281-83 (1982) (arguing that blackmail is similar to boycotts and that neither should be criminalized).
Haksar distinguishes civil disobedience from coercive threats according to the morality of the course of conduct the threatener will engage in if his threat is not carried out. See Vinit Haksar, Coercive Proposals [Rawls and Ghandi], 4 POL. THEORY 65, 67-68 (1976) . My argument, by contrast, is that a threat with an immoral end can be condemned as coercive without reference to the nature of the threatened action. 110 See supra text accompanying note 63.
Since the blackmailer's end is harm, the act is not redeemable by the possibility that some component of the means he uses might be lawful or beneficial. 111 Like the terror bomber, the direct intent of the blackmailer is to do unjustified harm, and as with terror bombing, such intentional harm is impermissible regardless of the benefits that might also flow from it.
D. The "Property Right" Objection
One problem some observers have with blackmail law is the absence of any "property right" that the blackmailer has violated.112 Property rights are usually understood as a particular subset of rights characterized by their transferability and exclusivity .113 American law gives only very limited transferable and exclusive rights in reputation. These are the "rights of publicity," which are effective against use of one's name or likeness in trade. 114 Admittedly, these transferable and exclusive rights in reputation do not apply to the kind of disclosure a blackmailer ordinarily contemplates. But nothing limits actionable "harm" to such a narrowly defined subset of rights. All that is needed is a HI One can argue that if an "end" is intentional harming, deontologic constraints will be violated even if a directly intended "means" is not itself harmful. For example, a person who perversely enjoys harming those he has benefitted may give candy to a child in the hope that the child will both enjoy the candy today and get cavities later. Whether or not the child is later affiicted with dental caries, it can be argued that the malevolent act still violates deontological constraints. One need not go so far in order to condemn a blackmailer's acts, however, for his means indeed do harm to his victim. n 2 Cf. Mack, supra note 109, at 276 (discussing the tension between rights-based and Eolicy-oriented justifications for criminalizing blackmail Reasoning, 26 YALE LJ. 710, 746-4 7 (1917) . n 4 In most states, the liberty to use one's name or depiction is "property" because exclusive rights to it can be conveyed to another. The turning point in the propertization of this liberty is the case of Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953) . The court held that a baseball player could make a binding assignment of a "right to publicity" encompassing the use of his photograph on baseball cards. Once such an assignment was made, it was binding even against other persons whom the player later wished to license and (presumably) against the baseball player himself.
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115
If it is intentionally harmed, some justification must be shown.
116
This is hardly a novel suggestion. In 1887 Sir Frederick Pollock "asserted it to be 'a general proposition of English law that it is a wrong to do wilful harm to one's neighbor without lawful justification or excuse.'" 117 The common law is full of examples where judges protect nonproperty interests against malice. REV. 149, 166-96 ( 1992) (discussing corrective justice as a substantive basis for property rights). American law has even premised property on 1uite inchoate rights, such as the liberty of using one's labor. See id. at 152-53. 16 What I suggest here does not enshrine the status quo, both because of the wide range of justifications that exist (giving rise to privileges to harm) and because nonholders have many rights, too. The theory I discuss here is conservative only if joined to the notion that rights must be negative, "freedom-from" rights. See ISAIAH BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY 7-16 (discussing liberty as a "minimum area of personal freedom" within which there can be no interference}. But deontologic rights can also be positive; consider, for example, Locke's obligation of charity, which "gives every Man a Title to so much out of another's Plenty, as will keep him from extream want, where he has no means to subsist otherwise. Halpern's article is a general defense of the prima facie tort approach, which makes tortious any unjustified intentional causing of harm. 118 One need not have a malicious feeling (spite, envy, etc.) in order to do a legally malicious act. Today "malice" (under that name or under the name "prima facie tort") is sometimes even used to refer to the causing of unjustified injury. Cf. Dan B. Dobbs, Tortious Inteif erence with Contractual Relationships, 34 ARK. L. REV. 335, 345-46 (1980) (discussing the disappearance of an original malice requirement and the uncertainty involved in the application of prima facie tort law).
On the possible role of intent-to-injure in malice, see supra text accompanying notes 105-06 discussing the doctrine of double effect).
119 A leading case here is Tuttle v. Buck, 119 N.W. 946 (Minn. 1909} (finding a cause of action where barber alleged that another barber was set up in a competing shof: solely to harm plaintiffs business). 20 The leading case here is Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 70 N.E.2d 401 (N.Y. 1946) (finding a sufficient allegation of a prima facie tort where plaintiff music publisher claimed injury from defendant radio show sponsor's unscientific ranking of song popularity). For a more general discussion, see Halpern, supra note 117; see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7-9 (1894} (discussing policymaking components in the judicial recof.1ition of a privilege to inflict harm, especially in economic contexts).
1 1 Perhaps the most vivid example, however, is provided by the classic case of absent, non-property interests receive some legal protection. For example, no one considers mental well-being a "property" interest, yet probably all states recognize a tort of assault, which requires intentionally placing another in fear or apprehension of contact, 122 and many states now recognize a tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 268 N.E.2d 915, 921 (Mass. 1971) (finding a cause of action where plaintiff suffered two heart attacks following harassment by a collection agency); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) .
124 See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 914-25 (Cal. 1968 ) (en bane) (allowing recovery for emotional distress to a mother who saw her child struck and killed by an automobile). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965) (finding no liability for negligent infliction of emotional disturbance absent physical harm).
125 Consider, for example, the spite fence cases. There the court protects a neighbor's nonproperty interest in, e.g., an unobstructed view, against a neighbor's malicious attempt to block it off. Were the fence builder to have a reason to build other than causing injury, then the court would not give the neighbor's view any protection. See, e.g., Roper v. Durham, 353 S.E.2d 476, 478 (Ga. 1987 ) (finding that possible malicious intent was insufficient to justify removal of a fence when the fence was also installed to mark the property's boundary).
126 See Second Treatise § § 25-51, in LOCKE, supra note 116. For a discussion arguing that Lockean property concepts are dependent upon an underlying right against harm, see Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self&pression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE LJ. 1533 , 154049 (1993 . For discussion of a similar connection from the perspective of corrective justice, see Gordon, supra note 115, at 180-96, 207-10, 238-48. Something like the "property rights" objection is sometimes attributed to Jeffrie Murphy, 127 but Professor Murphy has a more subtle difficulty with the liberal defense of blackmail law: he cannot see that the victim has had any rights violated. In particular, Murphy writes, a person who has done something discreditable has no right to a good reputation, so he has no ground for complaint if a blackmailer threatens to make discreditable but true disclosures.128 Using the language of corrective justice, Murphy seems to think that a deontological case cannot be made against blackmail because the victim's reputation is not a justified holding.
But the question of whether one has a "right to a good reputation" is irrelevant with regard to central case blackmail, for the deontological point is whether the victim has a right to be free from the harm that the other party intended and imposed. The harm intended and imposed in central case blackmail is not harm to reputation; it is harm to the victim's pocketbook or to her liberty.
The central case blackmailer does not seek to place the victim's reputation at its "proper" level, 129 nor is that the usual effect of his actions. 130 Rather, he seeks to extract something from the victim that is properly the victim's, usually money, or to make the victim do something (for example, sleep with him) that is ordinarily a behavior that the victim is at liberty not to engage in. The missing "rights" that Murphy seeks are therefore present and fairly noncontroversial: the rights not to have one's goods intentionally taken, or have one's liberty intentionally infringed, without justification.
It is irrelevant whether or not it would be proper for the blackmailer to disclose the information, and thus destroy something 127 See Mack, supra note 109, at 274-75 (criticizing the Murphy position). 128 See Murphy, supra note 40, at 162 ("It is unclear to me how you can have a right to the reputation of being a person of type X if in fact you have performed acts of type Y where Y acts are inconsistent with being an X person."}; see also Lindgren, supra note 10, at 699-700.
129 See Murphy, supra note 40, at 162. l!O Further, whether the victim deserves to have this person harm him is a different question from whether the victim deserves the harm in general. Considerations of corrective justice suggest that wrongful gains should be disgorged only to the individuals to whom redress is due, see Weinrib, supra note 41, at 429-50, or perhaps to the state. "Thus if A negligently injures X and B negligently injures Y, X cannot recover from B nor Yfrom A even if both injuries are identically quantifiable." Id. the victim may value at a price even higher than the goods demanded in the blackmail transaction. For no disclosure is intended and none occurs. Whatever justification might support disclosure, none supports a threat whose only motive and effect is to extract money or compliance. 131
E. Comparing Blackmail with the Ordinary Commercial Transaction
Libertarians who recommend the legalization of blackmail sometimes claim that there is no way to distinguish blackmail from an ordinary commercial transaction. 132 Yet the earlier discussion made clear there is an economic distinction: the central case blackmail transaction is nonallocative while the ordinary commercial exchange is allocative. 133 I here suggest two additional distinctions, each keyed to the deontological inquiry: first, that the blackmailer intends to harm; and second, that regardless of intent, the buyer of silence in an extortion transaction suffers a net harm, while the buyer in an ordinary commercial transaction is benefitted.134
Intent to Harm
The libertarian might argue that the ordinary buyer and seller have the same intent as the blackmailer does: that an ordinary buyer would be delighted to obtain goods without paying, and an ordinary seller would be delighted to obtain money without giving up goods. If so, the parties to the commercial transaction have the "real" or direct intent of extracting money or other advantage-just like the blackmailer.
Most buyers and sellers, however, would in the long run prefer not to be exploitative. Perhaps on occasion people might enjoy 181 Some liberties are permitted because they are good in themselves, and some for other reasons. When a liberty becomes disassociated from the reasons. that justified it, it can be prohibited. CJ. ARTHUR L. GOODHART, EssAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND TIIE COMMON LAW 179 (1931) (distinguishing between "liberties which the law recognizes and approves" and "liberties which the law recognizes but disapproves"). Thus disclosure is usually thought permissible because of the public interest in learning the relevant facts, and other related First Amendment concerns. These reasons are not available to justify nondisclosure. 135 See supra text accompanying note 54. 184 See infra parts IV.E.1-E.2. The discussion in part IV.E.2 also defends a particular conception of harm. getting something for nothing, but most persons' sense of self respect is probably dependent on at least some degree of reciprocity in the bulk of their relations. ll 15 If this is true (and I believe it is), then engaging in an ongoing activity that extracts something for nothing would be less desirable for most of us than engaging in commercial activity that involves exchanges.
The converse-DDE approach would test this assertion by asking if it would make a difference to the parties' actions if reciprocity were eliminated. I believe that for most of us it would make a difference if one took away the element in exchange that gives benefits to others. For example, if all young people were given a choice of engaging in a career involving mutual exchange or in a career of exploitation, most would probably choose the former even if success were guaranteed in both. Take away the component of the buyer or seller's activity that benefits others, and she will find the activity less attractive; if so, then under the DSE test, part of the "real" or direct intent is to exchange and not to extract.
Motive is a notoriously difficult basis on which to build fundamental legal distinctions. 136 This point leads to the second distinction between blackmail and ordinary commercial transactions: the ordinary commercial party offers another party a benefit (regardless of motive), but the blackmailer imposes a harm. Nothing bars lawgivers from taking less note of motives than moralists might; it is perfectly acceptable for the law to permit Mr. Scrooge to engage in badly motivated acts that give others benefits, and simultaneously to prohibit badly motivated and directly harmful acts such as blackmail.
Harm and Benefit
Defining what should constitute a "harm" or "benefit" is particularly difficult when an entire transaction is at issue, for the parties will be differently situated at different times. For example, it would be futile to define as a benefit the return of something that the other party stole only a moment before. In order to capture the meaning of "harm" for an entire transaction, I suggest (building on the work of Nozick 137 and Fried 138 ) that a transaction is "harmful" ifthe following three conditions are satisfied: (1) the thing the seller wants the buyer/victim to purchase is such that the buyer would be better off, in regard to that thing, if the seller and his resources 139 did not exist, (2) the buyer/victim would be better off if the transaction were impossible 140 and known by all parties to be impossible, and (3) 95-99 (1981) .
139 Among other changes, I have altered Nozick's first condition (that the victim/ purchaser would be better off in the absence of the seller) in several ways. Most importantly, in its new form, the first condition requires that the purchaser would be better off in the absence of the seller or his resources. Without this amendment one runs afoul of cases in which, for example, a landowner decides to cut off access to a distant portion of his estate solely to extract entrance fees from the frequent trespassers who use it as a shortcut. Cf. FRIED, supra note 138, at 95-99 (discussing such cases). With the amended first condition, it is clear that the trespassers are not "extorted" or harmed when they have to pay for access privileges, for they would not be better off in the absence of the landowner and his land. Without them, they would have no shortcut.
Arguably a substitute for the added "resources" language is Nozick's implicit third condition that the seller/victim is harmed only if she does not deserve to have the other inflict on her the threatened harm. See NOZICK, supra note 37, at 84 (implying that the buyer/victim who purchases freedom from harm cannot be said to have gained nothing if she deserved to be harmed by the seller). 140 The importance of the second condition can be illustrated by considering one ofLindgren's objections to Nozick. Lindgren interprets Nozick's position as resting solely on his first condition. See Lindgren, supra note 10, at 699. (This may be a legitimate interpretation; Nozick's presentation is far from pellucid.) Lindgren then poses a standard claim-of-right case: "[A)ssume a tree on your land falls into a highway, striking a passerby. He threatens to sue you unless you pay him money." Id. Presumably, you would prefer to settle rather than to be sued.
Lindgren correctly notes that Nozick's first condition cannot explain why this is not blackmail: since the person being sued may wish the other party had not existed, the first condition for an unproductive exchange is satisfied. See id. But the case does not satisfy Nozick's second condition. The landowner would be worse off if settling lawsuits were impossible. Therefore Lindgren's claim-of-right case is not central case blackmail, and the injured passerby is not harming the landowner ifhe extracts money in settlement or suit.
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As was suggested in an earlier section of this Article, these three conditions all appear to be met in cases of central-case blackmail.142 The third characteristic is present because the centralcase victim has not harmed the blackmailer. The second harmdefining characteristic is present because if exchanges of silence for money were known to be impossible, the victim would be better off because the blackmailer would not bother with the transaction. The first characteristic appears to be satisfied because the victim/buyer would be better off if the blackmailer and the piece of information suddenly vanished.
However, part of the first condition concerned the seller's resources, and I might be challenged to address whether the information the blackmailer wants to disclose is "his" resource. James Lindgren argues that blackmail is wrongful because the information belongs to third parties;
143 others have argued that blackmail is wrongful because, under a privacy analysis, the information belongs to the victim; 144 some libertarians think that blackmail is not wrongful because the information belongs to the blackmailer. 145
My response is simple: it does not matter whose resource the information is. If the information belongs to third parties or to the victim, the blackmailer is not selling something he owns, and the blackmail transaction can be condemned on that ground. But even if, as libertarians contend, the blackmailer "owns" the information, it is clear that the purchaser/victim is worse off in a world where the blackmailer and that resource exist. The blackmailer is therefore using that information in a way that harms the victim.146 In the ordinary commercial transaction, Seller (S) offers 142 See supra text accompanying notes 37-41.
145 See Lindgren, supra note 10, at 702-05.
144 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 40, at 159 (framing, though later criticizing, the argument that a blackmailer violates a victim's rights "by making into a commodity and trying to sell back to the victim something which is really his already (his life)").
145 See, e.g., ROTHBARD, supra note 132, at 157 (stating that "a man has no such objective property as 'reputation'").
146 Notice that my baseline for distinguishing harm from benefit is similar to that used in the standard tort case. "Harm" to a plaintiff in the usual tort context is determined by looking to the plaintifrs condition "in the absence of any interaction with the other party." Susan Rose-Ackerman, I'd Rather Be Liable Than You: A Note on Property Rules and Liability Rules, 6 INT'L REV. L. &: ECON. 255, 258 (1986) . The controversial but still dominant "but for" test of causation exemplifies this approach.
Of course, "interaction" requires definition. For example, a tort plaintiff does not lack actionable harm simply because the defendant had previously done the 1774 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141: 1741 Purchaser (P) some product or service that P wants that P could not have without paying S (or a supplier similar to S). If S (or a supplier similar to S) did not exist, P would have to do without the desired thing. P wants S to exist and make the off er. Conversely, P offers S money that S could not have without P (or a buyer similar to P). S wants P to exist and make the offer. S would be worse off if it were impossible for her to transact with P.
In paradigmatic blackmail, by contrast, the individual selling silence (SS) is selling the plagued purchaser (PP) an unaffected reputation, something that PP would have had but for SS's actions. SS creates a threat, then offers to remove the threat. If SS {or a supplier similar to SS) did not exist, PP would have the desired thing. In the language of traditional explanations of blackmail law, 147 SS is parasitic upon his victim. In deontologic terms, there is nothing in SS's actions that bespeaks a concern for PP's welfare or for PP's goals. To the contrary: SS is treating PP merely as a means, in a way he would pref er not to be treated.
148 SS is violating the "impermissibility of self-preference" that lies at the center of Kantian morality. 149 The distinction between central case blackmail and the ordinary commercial transaction thus seems fairly secure, on both economic plaintiff a great service in some unrelated incident. It is necessary to define the component of the other party's existence that is relevant. I have defined the scope of the relevant interaction by reference to the very resource whose allocation is at issue. 147 Hepworth's sociological eiramination of the British history of blackmail reveals parasitism or vampirism as a common image associated with blackmail. See MIKE HEPWORTH, BLACKMAIL: PuBUCITY AND SECRECY IN EVERYDAY LIFE 25 (1975) (describing blackmail as a "social evil-a parasitical growth on the otherwise healthy bodl of society, sapping its strength and undermining its constitution"). 48 A response might be that sometimes the blackmailer has a benign motive and his offer is indeed welcome to the victim. For example, take a journalist who comes across some information that would be painful to a given individual if disclosed. The information is, perhaps, of no substantive public import, yet "juicy" enough to give a small boost to the newspaper's circulation. Moved by concern for the individual, the reporter wishes not to publish; constrained by a fiduciary obligation to his newspaper, he is unwilling to benefit the individual at the expense of the newspaper. The reporter may offer to keep the item out of the newspaper provided the individual monetarily compensates the newspaper for the foregone circulation-boost. Such blackmail may be unlawful, but it is not condemned by the deontologic principle described above. Nozick argues such blackmail should be lawful, at least so long as the price for silence is no greater than what the journalist forgoes by his silence. See NOZICK, supra note 37, at 85-86. I take no position on this or other instances outside the domain of central case blackmail.
149 Ernestj. Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 LAW&: PHILOS. 37, 49-50 (1983) .
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TRUTH AND CONSEQUENCES 1775 and deontological grounds. Therefore, the primary libertarian argument against the wrongfulness of blackmail fails.
V. CRIMINALIZATION
The question still remains whether blackmail is the kind of act that should be criminalized. The deontological discussion above should have made clear that central case blackmail is a harmful act that, being unjustified and directly intended, is wrongful. 150 As a wrongful harm, its criminalization is consistent with the liberal view that only the presence of harm toward others justifies criminal prohibition. 151 It is also fairly clear that central case blackmail is economically w~teful because it invites expenditures that fail to make any significant change in the allocation of the contested inf ormation. 152 Therefore, criminalizing central case blackmail is probably also consistent with Jeffrie Murphy's view that "immorality plus disutility is a reasonable basis for criminalization." 153 Although central case blackmail therefore appears eligible for potential criminalization, the question of whether blackmail should in fact be criminalized requires further analysis. For example, if one took an economic approach to criminalization, one would want to investigate factors such as the extent of the harm caused by blackmail (either by the blackmailer or by the victim's use of selfhelp }, the extent to which criminalizing blackmail would decrease these harms, and whether the decrease in harm is likely to outweigh attendant enforcement costs. Though economics is not the whole of the matter, it will be useful to discuss some of these issues. 150 See supra text accompanying notes 80-87. 151 The liberal view that only the presence of harm toward others justifies criminal prohibition is associated historically with John Stuart Mill and more recently with Joel Feinberg. See MILL, supra note 64, at 91-92; see also JOEL FEINBERG, 4 THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOING 238 (1990) (exploring whether outlawing blackmail "satisfies the requirements of the harm principle").
A. The Effects of Blackmail Law on Victim Behavior and Perceptions
The effects that blackmail law might have on the behavior of potential defendants has been much discussed. 154 It is important to note that criminalization also has an impact on blackmail victims, providing them with two tools to encourage and assist them in resisting the blackmailer's demands.
155
The first tool the law provides is counter-leverage. The second is anger.
Counter-leverage
One imagines that were blackmail a tort, the victim would be unlikely to sue because of a fear that any trial of her suit would entail release of the embarrassing information which the victim wishes to keep secret. Unless in camera proceedings were easily available and enforceable, the information would come out; this disincentive to bringing suit would seem to provide one of the reasons why criminalization rather than a simple tort right is necessary if the law is to deter blackmail. Yet it is also commonly thought that when blackmail is criminal, victims are unlikely to report the crime out of a similar fear that prosecution would entail release of the embarrassing information. 156 Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence seems to be available suggesting that persons threatened with blackmail may have some hope of maintaining confidentiality even if they report the crime. 157 154 Prohibiting blackmail may deter directly or may encourage character-formation that discourages bad acts. By contrast, legalization might not only increase the threatrelated use of information already possessed, but might also increase the expenditures made on acquiring new information. Thus, criminalizing blackmail has an obvious goal of discouraging potential blackmailers from undertaking blackmail and blackmail attempts. Therefore, although blackmail law may fail to serve an individual who has the unfortunate luck to be the chosen prey of one of the few undeterred bad actors, the number of bad acts-and thus the number of victims-may be reduced by such law. 155 These tools are available whenever blackmail is unlawful, including instances beyond the central case of blackmail; whether the tools should be available is part of the question which needs to be answered whenever a type of blackmail is made unlawful.
156 See HEPWORTH, supra note 147, at 22 (by implication). The specific constitutional right to "public" trials in criminal matters, see U.S. CONST. amend. VI, would make secrecy of the proceedings even more unlikely than in the civil context. 157 See HEPWORTH, supra note 14 7, at 22-24 (noting that authorities in England are often willing to preserve confidentiality). One can question the empirical assumption that victims would in fact be as fearful of initiating a criminal prosecution as of bringing a civil suit. For example, the prevalence of plea bargaining in the criminal But determining how large a percentage of blackmail attempts are reported to the police is largely beside the point. The ability to threaten to go to the police may be more important than actually going to them. By threatening to go to the authorities if and only if disclosure is made, victims can discourage blackmailers from disclosing the contested information. 158 This is what Joel Feinberg terms "counterblackmail. " 159 The presence of counterblackmail makes criminalization important even if victims prior to disclosure are unwilling to seek the authorities' aid.
The law that criminalizes blackmail itself supplies to all victims a chip needed to engage in such counterblackmail: the law transforms the fact that the blackmail attempt has been made into information that could, if disclosed, subject the blackmailer to criminal prosecution. Essentially, the victim may tell the blackmailer that he will be reported unless he withdraws his unlawful threat.
Unlike the blackmailer, who uses the threat of disclosure to force the victim to give up something (for example, money) to which the blackmailer has no right, the victim engaging in counterblackmail is using her threat to enforce her rights-to force the blackmailer to cease his wrongful behavior towards her. Since this is the victim's "own chip, " 160 and the use of the chip as leverage is neither "unproductive" nor an "unjustified harming," 161 the victim should be permitted to make this counter-threat. Further, whether or not a state allows counterblackmail, it is hard to believe that a prosecutor would use her discretion to prosecute a victim who used counterblackmail to block continuing threats.
Given the criminalization of blackmail, then, the blackmailer and the assertive victim appear to be at a standoff: the blackmailer area might obviate the need for a public trial, and police could then keep the delicate information confidential. threatens to disclose unless money is paid, and the victim threatens to disclose unless the blackmailer abandons his threat. The victim's threat to disclose the blackmailer's threat may prevail as most credible, 162 for the blackmailer knows that if he discloses the victim will have nothing to lose. What would in fact occur case-bycase probably depends, inter alia, on the participants' strength of will, and on the level of the various positive and negative payoffs.168 But it seems clear that the criminalization of blackmail can serve as a tool to foil blackmail attempts in at least some instances.
Counter-leverage has another virtue as well. The possibility that offended persons will resort to violent self-help has always been part of the rationale for instituting legal rights, 164 and it has been suggested that blackmail should be made criminal lest victims have no choice but to employ violence and other undesirable self-help efforts against those who threaten them. The availability of counterblackmail not only tends to remove the occasion for self-help by potentially discouraging some blackmail attempts before they begin, but also gives the victim an alternative self-help weapon to protect herself, one that is much less destructive and disruptive to society as a whole than violence.
Anger
As Judge Posner has suggested, only sophisticated victims may be able to take advantage of the leverage that counterblackmail can provide. 165 But criminalization of blackmail has another function that is useful even for the unsophisticated victim. It reinforces her sense that she has a "right" to be free of such threats, and thus
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TRUTH AND CONSEQUENCES 1779 reinforces her willingness to angrily refuse the blackmailer's demands. Since a central case blackmailer has no incentive of his own to disclose, little may be required to dissuade him from disclosing; even unreasoned resistance may suffice. 166 Many commentators have noted that the legal prohibition of blackmail does not serve the interest of the victim who, in instances where the prohibition fails to deter, would prefer payment to disclosure.167 That is true. The image on which the blackmail prohibition rests is a quite different type of victim, one who is put into mental pain and fear by blackmail threats, 168 but who will nevertheless have no truck with dishonor. The image suggests a person should not be so ashamed of her past or so unwilling to face the truth that she would give in to ignoble manipulation. 169 "Honor" can be given a utilitarian construction: it is behavior that helps the collective even if it hurts the immediate actor. 170 166 If his threat fails, and if he is not in the business of making future threats credible, he has no reason to disclose; in fact, blackmail's unlawfulness gives him a good reason to lay low. Cf. supra part V.A.l (discussing counter-leverage). A thoughtful blackmailer may recognize that the probability that a victim will go to the police may increase dramatically after disclosure is made, even in cases where the victim was not originally aware of the option. 167 See, e.g., Lindgren, supra note 10, at 680-97 (discussing several commentators' theories of when a victim pays for information).
' 168 See HEPWORTH, supra note 147, at 19 (noting a judge's view of blackmail as "'slow death"' (quoting THE TIMES (LONDON), Apr. 2, 1924 (Justice Mccardle))); id. at 21 (characterizing blackmail as "'moral murder"'); id. at 22 (stating that the blackmailer's "ennervating [sic] and relentless pressure allegedly produced a state of suicidal despair"). 169 This may seem to contradict the stereotypical victim's almost mortal weakness described by Hepworth's researches. See supra note 168. But Hepworth recognizes that "by going to the police it was possible to stave off the appalling effects of moral murder." Id. at 23.
Hepworth quotes an aphorism stating that "Blackmail is possible only when individuals are discreditable." Id. at 7 (quoting LAUD HUMPHREYS, OUT OF THE CLOSETS (1972) ). This apparently assumes that the discreditable behavior necessary for a successful blackmail is the behavior that occurred some time in the past-the behavior the blackmailer has uncovered and now threatens to reveal. My argument is that blackmail is possible only when individuals exhibit discreditable behavior at the time of the blackmail threat because the honorable course of action at that time is to resist.
This notion of resistance appears occasionally in Hepworth's historical accounts of blackmail incidents. A news report of a nineteenth century blackmail trial stated: "It was not everyone who had the courage to come into court and show the absolute falsehood of the accusation made [by the blackmailer]; but Earl Carrington had done that, and he had performed a great service to the public in so doing." HEPWORTH, supra note 147, at 26 (quoting THE TIMES, Nov. 13, 1897 STUD. 321, 331 (1984) .
Recall that most economists assume that allowing blackmail will result in "digging up dirt only to rebury it again." See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text. This in turn assumes that the only factor that will matter to victims is a comparison of the price the blackmailer is demanding with the reputational cost of disclosure. That is, the primary economic analysis of blackmail assumes that victims will act with a particular and narrow set of self-interested economic motives. A victim with utilitarian or deontologic motives, by contrast, might act in a way that furthers the interest of society without furthering his own economically defined self-interest. 171 One might argue, however, that blackmail is beneficial in the information it reveals, but this would not apply to the central case which usually results in the purchase of silence. One might also argue blackmail is a useful tool for "keeping people honest" and increasing the social costs of bad action; this point might be relevant in assessing the costs and benefits of outlawing central case blackmail. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
172 From a deontologic perspective, resistance to evil is a fundamental virtue. See BECKER, supra note 135, at 74-76, 97-101, 146-50. The victim who accedes to tyranny today exposes other victims to vulnerability tomorrow. Furthermore, buying silence is an evil in a way that being silent may not be. Passively hiding awkward facts-for example, choosing to live a creditable life in a new town after serving a criminal sentence-does not "use" others in the way that a deliberate decision to conceal may do. Finally, in buying silence, one also shows insufficient respect for one's self. To pay to hide something about one's self may be a shaming act inconsistent with human flourishing. Cf. Radin, supra note 23, at 1906 (arguing that understanding integral aspects of our personal lives as "monetizable or completely detachable from the person .
•. is to do violence to our deepest understanding of what it is to be human"). 
TRUTH AND CONSEQUENCES 1781 but also on potential victims and on their sense of what their own best behavior should be. If blackmail is criminalized, by contrast, it helps maintain a sense of outrage as a weapon against blackmail. As in any bilateral monopoly situation, it is the person who "won't budge," and can credibly convince the other that she won't in fact budge, who wins. Several commentators have suggested the blackmail bargain is often irrational-a last gasp effort to stave off nearly inevitable catastrophe, in which the victim will almost always be the long-term loser.
174 If so, anger may be the best antidote to panic. Anger is a passionate emotion, yet, ironically, in this context it may be the best preserver of rationality.
The following discussion, though tentative, will suggest some reasons why this may be the case. The blackmailer brings up something embarrassing or private. It is a shaming experience to have such facts brought up by a hostile party. (Raised by a friend, the same issues' exposure can lead to increased intimacy rather than shame.) Shame can inhibit both justified anger and the selfconfidence necessary for self-protection. 175 Yet, as the Sabini and Silver analysis 176 of the Milgram experiments 177 showed, sometimes one needs confidence in one's self-willfulness, unwillingness to go along-in order to do right under pressure. The potential and anger survives the erosion that legalization might initiate, then that partially undoes the assumption on which the arguments of Daly & Giertz et alia are premised. 185 The victim's willingness to pay would no longer be a function solely of the damage disclosure could do; she might be unwilling to pay despite significant destructive potential. In such an event, blackmail attempts could spark allocative changes in the distribution of information.
To the extent that criminalizing blackmail would deprive third parties of information that would be disclosed if blackmail were lawful, the costs and benefits of such fore gone disclosure would have to be assessed and incorporated into the economists' analysis of blackmail law. The economic analysis would become more complex.
From a deontological perspective, however, it would not matter whether or not blackmail attempts would sometimes result in beneficial disclosures of information. The doctrine of double effect indicates that a person making extorsive threats cannot escape moral condemnation by pointing to unintended beneficial sideeffects of her behavior. Thus, to the extent that the desire to resist blackmail is a fact of human psychology, the accounts of central case blackmail provided by economic and deontologic theorists might diverge.
Perhaps we finally have, if not a paradox, an irony. When victims act as deontological moral agents, they resist, and a government applying a deontological approach would aid their resistance by deciding that blackmail is wrongful and should be discouraged. When victims act as narrowly-defined economic agents (motivated by the Daly-Giertz demand structure), a government applying economic logic would recognize that blackmail is wasteful and similarly decide that it should be discouraged. Thus, a nation that is ruled by the same single-gauge principles as its people would outlaw blackmail. But when the motives of a significant portion of the victim population are moral rather than economic, and the government applies an economic logic in ordering legal relations, it is then that the deontological and consequential logics may lead to diverging recommendations. It may be that the two accounts are most likely to converge, ironically, when the economic account fails to take account of the other's effects.
Postscript
Ironies aside, I want to acknowledge that the sharp distinctions made in this paper between consequentialism and deontology are merely a mode of facilitating discourse. The final judgment on blackmail law (or any law) should depend neither on consequentialism nor on deontologic morality, but on some as yet unstated combination of the two. A primary task for normative theory is to provide a satisfactory integration of the objective and subjective viewpoints 186 that, together, appeal to us as constitutive of morality.
